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U.N. PEACE-KEEPING POLICY: SOME BASIC
SOURCES OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

AGOLA AUMA-OSOLO*
Policy, as defined by students of public administration1 and
public policy,2 is succinctly, a principle, plan, course of action
or means by which one intends to achieve given or perceived goals.
The stage between policy and the pursued goal is implementation.
Thus, to achieve the goals in question, one must implement, that
is, carry out or execute the chosen policy. In short, implementation is an interaction or social mechanism between the perceived
goals and the actions deliberately geared to achieving them.
Therefore, the concept "U.N. Peace-Keeping Policy," means
the method by which the United Nations plans to achieve its goal
which, in this case, is "world peace." The concept "Implementation Problems," refers to those obstacles either inherent or temporarily embedded in peace-keeping policy execution.
Viewing the international political situation today, a number
of persistent crises constituting potential threats to international
peace and security are observed. For instance, there exist:
* Visiting Research Fellow, Canadian Peace Research Institute.
My gratitude is due to those prominent students of International Law whom

I met at The Hague Academy of International Law, The Hague, Netherlands, during the summer of 1969, including Professors H.W. Briggs, the late W. Friedmann,

S. Oda, G. Balladore-Pallieri, P. Well, J.G. Castel, V. Koutikor, M. Fenid, B.
Goldman, G. van-Heckle, P. Bonassies, and L.I. deWinter. This work is partially
a product of their penetrating and motivating ideas; however, any mistake or error
is entirely my own. Also, I express my gratitude to Professor Marcello Pagano
of the Statistical Science Division at SUNY/Buffalo, and San Le Tran, for their
statistical assistance and advice; to Professor Rudolf Widenmann of the University of Mannheim, West Germany, and Philip Speser for their criticisms on the
first draft; and finally to San Le Tran who worked with me on the final draft.
1. See generally H. SIMON, ADMtNISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1959); J. MARCH,
ORGANIZATIONS (1958); J. PFIFFNER, MUNICIPAL ADMImSTRATION (1940); F.
SHERWOOD,
BuREAUCRAcY

ADMImSTRATrvE

ORGANIZATION

(1960);

C.

JACOB,

POLICY

AND

(1966).

2. See generally T. DYE, AMEmcAN PUBLIC POLICY, DOCUMENTS AND Es-

(1969); I SHARAN KY,

THE RoUTrNG OF POLmCS (1970); R. Pansrus,
ORoANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, AN ANALYSIS AND THEORY (1962); R. HoFFERBERT,
STATE AND URBAN POLITICS (1971).
SAYS

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1976

1

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2 [1976], Art. 5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 6

1. A chronic war in the Middle East between the Arab
states and the state of Israel. The fourth war remains
partially unresolved since October 6, 1973. Moreover,
the United States and the Soviet Union have intervened
in the dispute by helping the Israelis and Arabs, respectively, with war materials.3
2. Racial confrontation in Southern Africa. In the Republic
of South Africa and Namibia, the policy of apartheid is
employed by a ruling white minority to oppress an indigenous black majority. Rhodesia, with an overwhelming
black majority of fifteen to one, is experiencing open conflict, in the form of guerrilla warfare, fueled in part by
British Commonwealth aid to Mozambique, a firm oppo4
nent of white rule in Rhodesia.
3. A chronic anti-semitic policy deliberately instituted and
enforced by the government of the Soviet Union against
the minority Jewish population in the area.5
4. And, protracted Irish self-annihilation between the Catholics and Protestants. 6
At the end of World War II the United Nations was created
and legally charged, under the U.N. Charter, with responsibility
for world peace-keeping, 7 and preservation of human rights." Why
has the United Nations failed to fulfill its mission of eliminating
chronic wars, genocide, and other inhumane acts and policies? It
must also be asked, what progress has the United Nations made so
far in conformity with its responsibilities? What are the major
obstacles preventing it from executing its responsibilities? In the
event of such obstacles, what can be done by the U.N. to overcome
them and fulfill its obligations?
3. CBS Television Evening News, Oct. 10, 1973.
4. W. FRY, IN WHITEST AFRICA: THE DYNAMICS OF APARTHEID (1968).
5. P. LEDuAi,
EUROPE (1971).
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6. Nightmare of History, 215 NATION 644 (1972); Grim Saviors for
Doomsday, TIME, Nov. 4, 1974, at 47.
7. See U.N. CHARTER cs. VI, VII; R. HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967, DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY (1969); J. BOYD, UNITED
NATIONS

PEACE-KEEPING

OPERATIONS:

A

MILITARY

AND

POLITICAL APPRAISAL

(1971); Papadopoulos, The Maintenance of International Peace and the U.N., A
Legal Analysis, 6 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 800-56 (1975).
8. That is, the fundamental principles of human rights-the belief in equality of man under the law. U.N. CHARTER preamble, art. 1, para. 3; art. 55. For
further definition of the concept, see L. SOHN, CASES ON UNrrED NATIONS LAW

645-46 (1956).
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Because of these concerns, the substance of this article is
three-fold. First, the author will re-examine the fundamental
sources of the United Nations' administrative responsibilities relating to world political crisis. Second, he will analyze the nature
and scope of those obstacles which might interfere with the United
Nations' administrative progress. The goal of this analysis is to
present these obstacles in quantitative form, to support a theory
which will both explain and predict the phenomena controlling
United Nations policy implementation and law enforcement. Finally, he will attempt to critically analyze and prescribe some
remedial steps which must be taken to enable the United Nations
to restore its legal administrative responsibilities, and to implement these responsibilities in order to eradicate the recurrent international hostilities which constitute threats to world peace and
human development.
The underlying propositions in this article are that: 1) The
United Nations is a bureaucratic organization. It is rational and
goal-oriented. However, because of the complexity of its goal,
the management of world crises, the U.N. will formulate rational
policies and rigorously execute those policies in pursuing its goals.
2) Formulation and execution of foreign policies among nationstates are rooted in and guided by what Professor Hans Morgenthau calls "international politics defined in terms of power."
Man has always sought to maximize" or to satisfy" his options
or gains in transactions with his fellow man. Therefore, it should
be expected that a nation which is no more than the sum total of
individuals, and whose foreign policy-making apparatus is staffed
and guided by individuals, would be "self-seeking." The more a
nation is self-seeking, the more its national interests on the world
chessboard will conflict with those of the United Nations. This
conflict, and the United Nations' lack of powerful enforcement
mechanisms vis i vis "criminal" states will paralyze the U.N.'s competence. Thus, the U.N.'s efforts will be disrupted by states' egocentric political attitudes and activities favoring their individual
national interests.
Based on these premises, the author's final argument will be
that it is imperative for the United Nations to immediately inno9. H MORGENTHAU, PoLmcs AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
AND PEACE5 (4th ed. 1967).
10. A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 11 (1957).
11. H. SIMON, ADmriISTRATrW BEHAVIOR 39 (1957).
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vate new concepts to cope with the complexity of today's world.
Such innovation would remove the afore-mentioned responsibilities
from states and restore them to the United Nations. In performing
this task, the U.N. must develop more organs and appendages which
are powerful enough to withstand and counteract states' obsessive
passions, and effective enough to execute its peace-keeping policy
for attainment of the goals for which it was established.

I. AN

OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE U.N.'s RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBSTACLES IN WORLD
'POLITICAL CRISES

A.

The Birth andResponsibilitiesof the UnitedNations

Geo-politically, the headquarters of the United Nations is
located in New York City. 12 The International Court of Justice
is based at The Hague. In December, 1946, the Second General
Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution providing for
a light-blue U.N. flag with the official emblem of the United Nations at its center, a symbol of the reality of the United Nations.'"
Endowed with international personality in the World Community, the United Nations became a juristic person sui generis. In
spite of the fact that the U.N. is neither a state nor a sovereign,' 4
factors which make the U.N.'s legal personality quite distinct from
that of its Member-States, the U.N. has the right to "enjoy in the
territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be
12. On June 26, 1947, the United Nations and the United States put into

effect the General Assembly resolution adopted in December, 1946, establishing
the seat of the United Nations in New York City. The agreement extended to
the United Nations substantial privileges and freedom in its headquarters district,

including the right to establish and maintain its own independent receiving and
sending wireless stations.

Although United States federal, state and local laws

apply to acts and transactions carried out in the U.N.'s headquarters district, the
U.N. has its own full executive power. See Agreement Between the United Nations
and the United States regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, done at
Lake Success, June 26, 1947, 11 U.N.T.S. 11. See also Brandon, The Legal Status

of the Premises of the United Nations, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 90 (1951).
13.

G.A. Res. 92, U.N. Doc. A/204 (1946).

14. It has been pointed out by the International Court of Justice that the
legal nature of the United Nations is more akin to a confederation of States than
it is to a federation. For instance, the right of Member-States to withdraw from
the Organization, the practical absence of any strong legislative powers, and the
presence of the bond of sand between Member-States and the U.N. are good illustrations of handicaps to the competence of the world body. Clark, Introduction
to World Peace Through World Law, PEACE IS POSSIBLE: A READER ON WORLD
ORDER 108-33 (1966).
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necessary for 5the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of
its purposes.
It must not be misconstrued that these provisions purport
to overpersonify the United Nations to a super-state status vis d vis
the sovereignty of its Member-States. The Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations provides that "the
United Nations shall possess juridical personality."' 6 It also states
that the U.N. shall have the capacity to contract, to acquire and
dispose of immovable and movable property, to institute legal proceedings, 17 and, finally, that this juridical personality is not limited
to the capacity of action within the spheres of municipal law.' 8
However, the United Nations "is based on [and respects] the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members."' 9 Nevertheless, as
will be noted hereafter, the scope of the Law of the United Nations
is comparatively broad. For instance, the Charter recognizes the
contractual capacity of the organs of the United Nations in a wide
sphere of treaties."
Article 62 of the Charter provides another extension of the
legal personality with regard to the Economic and Social Council's
contractual prefecture over various specialized international organizations which operate under the auspices of the United Nations.
In addition, the powers of the Security Council, aided by the
powers of the Secretary-General and General Assembly, in coping
with solving situations threatening international peace and security,
are well within the scope of legislative action. Moreover, the
Charter's concern for fundamental human rights and freedoms is
highly important.
For example, the United Nations has the power "to maintain

international peace and security .... ,2'"to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character .. . ,22 and "to
be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attain15. U.N. CHARTER art. 104.
16. Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, art.
1, G.A. Res. 22, U.N. Doc. A/43 (1946).
17. Id., art. 2.
18. Id., art. 5.
19. U.N. ClLtRTER art. 2, para. 1.
20. See, e.g., Id., arts. 57, 63.
21. Id., art. 1, para. 1.
22. Id., para. 3.
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ment of these common ends." 8 The provisions of article 35
require both Members and non-Members of the United Nations
to bring their disputes to the attention of the Security Council or
the General Assembly as envisioned in article 34.24 Under articles
33 and 36, the Security Council may make recommendations to
the parties concerned as to the settlement of their disputes, or
ipso facto, may recommend that the dispute be referred to the
International Court of Justice2 5 in accordance with its Statute. 26
Furthermore, under chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council has full competence vis ti vis article 2 to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
to "call upon
aggression and shall make recommendations . . .
the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures
In addition, the Council
as it deems necessary or desirable."2
may "decide what measures . . .2 to "take . . . by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."' 0 And, finally, it may establish a
military staff for advisory purposes "on all questions relating to
the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance
of international peace and security. .. .
These provisions are indispensable indicators of the legal
competence of the U.N.'s political organs over the duties for which
it was created. The International Court of Justice is the primary
judicial organ of the United Nations. 2 Under the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, "[t]he Court may give an advisory
opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may
."831
be authorized by . . . the Charter of the United Nations ...
However, there is one fundamental problem which always
confronts the United Nations in its duties. The problem is that of
"domestic jurisdiction," emanating from article 2(7) of the U.N.
Charter.
23. Id., para. 4.
24. Id., art. 35, paras. 1, 2.
25. Id., art. 33, para. 2; art. 36, paras. 1-3.
26. I.C.J. STAT.
27. U.N. CHRTEa art. 39.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id., art. 40.
Id., art. 41.
Id., art. 42.
Id., art. 47, para. 1.
I.C.J. STAT. art. 1.

33. Id., art. 65, para. 1.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol6/iss2/5

6

Auma-Osolo: U.N. Peace-Keeping Policy: Some Basic Sources of its Implementati
U.N. PEAcE-KEEPING POLICY

As will be discussed subsequently, the problem of domestic
jurisdiction has gravely disrupted the United Nations' peace-keeping
duties. It has made the organization ineffective and too slow to
carry out the duties for which it was established. It has also created
numerous new disputes between and among the Member-States,
when existing disputes were brought before the Security Council,
General Assembly or International Court of Justice. In retrospect, unlike all other articles in the U.N. Charter, article 2(7)
has always been a great handicap to the United Nations. Article
2(7) is often invoked against United Nations' attempts to intervene
against oppressive Member-States. The 1951 Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company Case, the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1947 Indonesia conflict,
the Algerian question, the Congo dispute and the Vietnam War all
show that it remains a chronic source of bitter argument in the
United Nations, especially in the Security Council. 4
In these disputes, many opposing views exist concerning
interpretation of article 2(7). One side upholds the U.N.'s legal
right and necessity of intervention in such disputes, while the other
bitterly criticizes the United Nations on the ground that nothing
contained in the present Charter authorizes the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of a state.33 Nevertheless, all but one of the aforementioned disputes 36 were finally surrendered to the United Nations for settlement. It is possible that these disputes could have
led to World War HI3 had there not been a United Nations,
34. See A. Auma-Osolo, The Law of the United Nations as Applied to Interventions within the Framework of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, A Comparative Analysis of Selected Cases, 1969 (thesis, Univ. of N. Carolina Library,
Chapel Hill, N.C.) with respect to the following selected cases:
(a) Nationalization problems:

(b)

(i) The 1951 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Cases
(ii) The 1956 Suez Canal Company Case
Nationalism versus Colonialism problems:
(i) The 1958 Indonesia Case
(ii) The 1955 Algerian crisis

(c)

Establishment of order within a nation:

(i) The 1960 Congo (Zaire) problem
(ii) The Vietnam War, 1954-1974.
[hereinafter cited as Auma-Osolo].
35. These five cases are not the only ones in which this problem occurred.
It has become a traditional tool of Member-States to deny the competence of the
U.N. whenever they engage in international politics, the struggle for power.
36. The Vietnam dispute was never submitted to the U.N. for settlement.
37. The Suez Canal and Congo issues were especially volatile.
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and had the United Nations not been rationalenough to intervene
in spite of objections of the parties involved.
But, what seems to be the precise source of such problems,
and, how can this phenomenon be systematically explained?
B. The U.N.'s Obstacles:
The Problem of DomesticJurisdiction
As noted above, the U.N. Charter, which authorizes the
United Nations to be an international weapon for world peace
and security is the same Charter which attempts to prohibit the
United Nations from executing these duties. The prohibition
clause in the Charter reads as follows:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII.38

This double phraseology in article 2(7) has caused some
confusion to Member-States concerning those political and legal
organs of the United Nations responsible for peace-keeping and
preservation of human rights. At the same time, heated debates
have erupted among a number of students of International Law as
to the relative weight between the domestic jurisdiction and peacekeeping provisions under article 2(7), and chapters VI and VII
respectively, of the U.N. Charter. 9
This article will attempt not only to reconcile those differing schools of thought, but also to measure the relative weights of
article 2 (7) and chapters VI and VII of the Charter. This analysis will concentrate on the terms of those provisions as they relate
38. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., H. KELSEN, Tim LAw OF THE UNrrED NATIONS (1951); H.
LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950); M. RAVAN,
UNITED NATIONS AND DOMESTIC JURISDICTION (1958); Miller, Legal Aspects of
the United Nations Action in the Congo, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 10 (1961); Wijewardane, Criminal Jurisdiction over Visiting Forces with Special Reference to InterY.B. INT'L L. 351, 396-97
national Forces, Some Legal Problems, 37 BaR.
(1961); Auma-Osolo, A Retrospective Analysis of United Nations Activity in
the Congo and the Significance for Contemporary Africa, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 451-74 (1975).
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to the peace-keeping mission. To do -this, three questions will be
examined in detail.
1. Is domestic jurisdiction a serious problem to the Security
Council and the General Assembly? In the words of F. Ermacora,
"[t]he domestic jurisdiction problem is a key problem interesting
both international law and national law."4
Article 2(7) is, of
course, a centrifugal phenomenon of two different principles. One
attempts to prohibit the Security Council and General Assembly
from intervention "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state .... -1 while the other exempts
Member-States from submission of "such matters to settlement
under the . . . Charter ... .
The first principle forbids both organs from interfering in the
domestic jurisdiction of its Member-States. The second principle
authorizes the Member-States to be masters of their domestic affairs, and to have complete liberty at all times to do as they desire
in that sphere without fear of sanction by higher authority. Or, if
they so desire, they may forward their disputes to the United Nations for settlement. Moreover, it could also mean that parties to
such disputes are willy-nilly free either to accept or refuse any
recommendations they are given by the United Nations.
In fact, the first principle, if examined meticulously, has,
as does the second principle, a multiplicity of contradictions. For
instance, its assumed prohibition concerns only the United Nations
but not the Member-States while the latter seem to be free to act
as they please. Thus, any Member-State is seemingly free to
intervene in the domestic affairs of other Member-States, provided
that it does not use the flag of the United Nations. 3
However, it is evident that under article 2(3), the Charter
bids all Member-States to "settle their international disputes by
peaceful means . . . in order not to endanger international
peace and security. Article 2(4) requires all Member-States to
"refrain in their internationalrelations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
40.
Academy
41.
42.

F. Ermacora, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction, The Hague
of International Law (1968) (emphasis added).
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7, cl. 1.
Id., cl. 2.

43. Such intervention has been staged by nations such as Belgium in the
Congo, the U.S. in Cuba, and the U.S.S.R. in Czechoslovakia. See also Table
I infra.
44. U.N. CHARm art. 2, para. 3.
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any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations."4 5 But, do the Member-States observe
these obligations?
On examining those purposes of the U.N. mentioned in the
last clause of article 2(4) it can be seen that the U.N. is charged
with the following four duties:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international
law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character . . .;
of nations in
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions
46
the attainment of these common ends.
Since this study concerns the management of peace and security more than economic, social and cultural matters, the most
pertinent purposes for consideration here are the first, second,
and fourth. Upon analysis of these three purposes, it is noted
that the political organs of the U.N. are charged with the responsibility to foster and nurture world peace and security,47 to cultivate and preserve the principle of human rights and self-determina49
tion of all peoples, 48 and to be a world forum to this end.
Consequently, since article 2(7) is a contradiction repugnant to
these three principles, its interpretation is open to question.
Lauterpacht states that "the extent to which the purpose of the
Charter in the matter of the protection of human rights is affected
by Article 2, paragraph 7 . . . has justly been regarded as of
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.,
Id.,
See
See
See

art. 2, para. 4 (emphasis added).
art. 1, paras. 1-4.
id., para. 1.
id., para. 2.
id., para. 4.
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crucial significance." 50 Furthermore, he warns that although
"paragraph 7 of article 2 refers only to such action on the part
of the United Nations as amounts to intervention; it does not rule
out measures falling short of intervention."5 1
Here, Lauterpacht exposes another concept, the meaning of
which must be understood in international relations theory. In
his definition of "intervention", Lauterpacht writes:
Intervention is a technical term of . . . unequivocal connotation. It signifies dictatorial interference of the State. It implies a peremptory demand for positive conduct or abstention
-a demand which.., involves a threat of or recourse to compulsion, though not necessarily physical compulsion, in some
form. This has52 been the current interpretation of the term
"intervention."
Referring to Professor James Brierly's definition of the concept,
Lauterpacht maintains that in a more precise definition, intervention is an action in which "the interference must take an imperative form," and that "it must either be forcible or backed by
the threat of force."' 5 Lauterpacht concludes that "intervention
is thus a peremptory demand or an attempt at interference accompanied by enforcement, or threat of enforcement in case of noncompliance.""
It was due to the problem of interventionphobiathat the framers of the Charter incorporated article 2(7) into the Charter, to the
detriment of the responsibilities of the United Nations. But, as
Lauterpacht questions, in the event of disputes likely to constitute
a threat to peace,55 what is the essence of article 2(7)?
50. H.

LAuTm"RACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RiGHTs

[hereinafter cited as

166 (1950)

LAuTERPACHT].

51. Id. at 167.
52. Id.
53. Id. See also BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 284 (4th ed. 1949). Furthermore, by referring to other definitions of "international law," Professor Lauterpacht offers numerous interpretations: Oppenheim (1912) -intervention
is
"dictatorial interference by a State in affairs of another State;" Lawrence (1905)
-intervention is an "action aiming at enforcement;" Strupp (1934), and Lauterpacht (1948)-"[i]n its accepted scientific connotation, intervention is to impose
the will of one or more States upon another State in an imperative form." IAuTERPACHT, supra note 50, at 166.
54. LAuTERPAcHT, supra note 50, at 168.
55. Id. at 170. For examples of such behavior see inter alia, the cases of
Indonesia, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Suez and Zaire in Auma-Osolo, note 34,
supra.
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Again, Professor Lauterpacht notes:
One of the reasons for the comprehensive formulation of
Article 2, paragraph 7, as finally adopted, was the desire to
exclude the possibility of the Economic and Social Council's
making a specific recommendation, addressed to the parties
to the dispute, in a matter which is primarily within their
domestic jurisdiction. This does not mean that Article 2,
paragraph 7 excludes recommendations either general or specific, with regard to all other spheres of the activities of the
United Nations. 5 6
He further states that:
The wide limitation of Article 2, paragraph 7 was inserted at
San Francisco--in contrast with the limitation in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, which excluded intervention only in
connection with the settlement of disputes-for the reason
that; the United Nations and, especially, its Economic and
Social Council were granted broader powers and authorities
it was necessary expressly to exclude the possibility of their
interfering directly in the domestic economy, social culture,
or cultural or educational arrangement of the Member57
States.
Thus, by incorporating article 2(7) into the Charter, the
framers' aim was "to rule out direct legislative intervention by
the United Nations in matters normally reserved to the Legislature
of the State."58
But, is direct legislation by the United Nations which imposes rules of conduct upon States a legal right of the U.N. under
chapters VI and VII of the Charter, or does it constitute intervention under article 2(7) of the Charter? According to Professor
Hans Kelsen, "article 2, paragraph7, does not mean, that Members
are authorized to settle such matters, and particularlydisputes, by
the employment of force."' 59 Although Member-States have an
option to peacefully settle their disputes in accordance with the
provisions of chapter VI, under the same chapter they "are not
allowed to settle their disputes by the threat or use of force be56. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 50, at 170.
57. Id. at 171.
58. Id.
59. H. KELsEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 295 (1966)

added) [hereinafter cited as

(emphasis

KELSEN].
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cause a threat or use of force may always be considered by the
Security Council to constitute a threat to or breach of the peace."60
Under this view, the monopoly of centralized force in the
United Nations for peace-keeping missions under chapter VII
is not affected by article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.
2. Is domestic jurisdiction a serious problem to the International Court of Justice? Article 2, paragraph 7 has not only
been a problem to the legislative organs of the United Nations but
also to its judicial organ, the International Court of Justice.
Occasionally, "[t]he General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question."'" Similarly, other organs
of United Nations may "request advisory opinions of the Court on
legal questions arising within the scope of their activities." 2 On
the other hand, in cases which seem to be entirely legal, the Security Council must refer them to the International Court.6 3 Under the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Court may
give "an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of
whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations to make such a request.""4
Contrary to the provisions above, article 2(7)'s prohibition
against interference in domestic matters has occasionally been invoked against the Court. For example, when the U.N. General
Assembly requested -the Court for an advisory opinion on the
interpretation of the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and
Rumania the parties to this dispute challenged the Court's jurisdiction. The grounds for this objection were that by requesting
an opinion on observance of human rights, the General Assembly
was indeed intervening in matters essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of those Member-States, and therefore allegedly in
violation of article 2(7).66 In the Anglo-Iranian Oil question,
Iran, the defendant, questioned the Court's competence. Iran
maintained that under article 2(7) neither the Court nor any other
organ of the United Nations had jurisdiction over the case which,
Iran asserted, was essentially within Iranian domestic jurisdiction.6 6
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. U.N. CHARTE art. 96, para. 1.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id., para. 2.
See id., art. 36, para. 3.
I.C.J. STAT. art. 65, para. 1.
5 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 588-91 (1951).
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, [1951] I.CJ. 281-319.
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Generally, some Member-States of the U.N. contend that the
Court, as an organ of the United Nations, should fall under the prohibition clause of article 2(7).11 On the other hand, in spite of
the fact that the Court is subject to limitations under article 2(7)
it should be noted that the Court, as a judicial organ of the organization designed to maintain international order, is bound to
execute its peace-keeping responsibilities under chapter VII as
stressed in article 2(7).68 Moreover, if the Court were to defer
to the parties concerned in every dispute involving a potential
threat to international peace and security, then why should it be
called a World Court? Similarly, if the framers of the U.N. Charter concluded that Member-States possessed the exclusive right to
pursue their own course and to handle their international problems
as they pleased, then the very reason for the creation of the U.N.
is called into question.
Addressing itself to similar questions during the Algerian
crisis in 1955 between France and the Algerian people, the General Assembly strongly protested:
If France were permitted to decide, on the basis of her own
unilateral interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, what a body of the United Nations could or could not
discuss, then France would in effect have a veto power over
the business of the Assembly and this was not the manner in
which the framers of the Charter intended Article 2(7) to be
69
applied.
Professor Kelsen argues that both the International Court of
Justice and Member-States, especially those who are parties to
disputes in question, should decide independently whether certain
matters fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, since the latter
is also subject to the intervention restrictions. 70 To M.S. Rajan,
however, Kelsen's idea "seems palpably absurd, particularly with
respect to the Court (where such a view has fatal implications),
71
that the point need not be laboured any further."
In 1935, Professor Kelsen asserted:
It goes without saying that, within an international legal community whose centre of gravity is in the administration of in67. Auma-Osolo, supra note 34, at 42-48.

68. See U.N.

CHARTER art.

2, para. 7, cl. 2.

69.

10 U.N. GAOR 181 (1955).

70.

KELSEE, supra note 59, at 258.
RAJAN, UNfED NATIONS AND DOMESTC JURISDICTION

71. M.
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ternational justice, there must be a place for an organism
whose special function it is to prevent disputes between States,
or, in the event of them having arisen, to endeavor to get them
settled out of court, in short, by bringing the parties together
to make an amicable settlement. Such an organism is exemplified in the League of Nations Council and the Permanent
Court of Justice. The members of the community ought not
to have the option of pleading their case before one or the
other tribunal. The authority of the judicial organism should
only be set aside when the Council has successfully intervened and when the dispute has been removed by amicable
72
arrangement.
Thus, Professor Kelsen anticipated a powerful international judicial operation superior to any national legislative and judicial apparatus for maintenance of world order. This apparatus would be
built on the premise that the contemporary international legal system must abandon the primitive forms of hue and cry and posse
comitatus. The Court was envisioned as being powerful enough
to compel compliance. It would have to compel Member-States
subject to its compulsory jurisdiction to follow specific rules of
conduct; and it would impose definite sanctions so that a state
would not proceed in any disorderly fashion, by instituting, as necessary, acts of coercion against that criminal state.
Yet when the Court was finally established in 1946 with the
"Kelsenian Compulsory Jurisdiction" incorporated into the Statute,7" Kelsen reversed the table against the Court in favor of Member-States' domestic jurisdiction! But, if the Court's competence
were to be equated to that of the Member-States' courts as Professor Kelsen now suggests, then how could the Court function
effectively, as anticipated by article 36(6) of the Statute?
Furthermore, given that article 36(6) of the Statute provides that
"[i]n the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdic' 74
tion, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court,
why should the Court's role in its peace-keeping mission against
aggressor states be affected by article 2(7) of the Charter? This
is a contradiction of purposes.
3. What are the roots of article 2(7)? Article 2, paragraph
7 defined in terms of domestic jurisdiction protection against
72. H. KELSEN, THE LEGAL PROCESS
[hereinafter cited as THE LEGAL PROCESS].
73. See I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, para. 5.
74. Id. para. 6.
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United Nations' intervention is essentially a transplant of article
15(8) from the Covenant of the League of Nations to the Charter
75
of the United Nations.
Article 15 (8) of the League Covenant reads as follows:
If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them,
and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by
international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of
that party, the Council shall so report and shall make no
76
recommendations as to its settlement.
By this paragraph, the Council of the League of Nations' competence did not extend to international disputes arising out of
matters which were found to be "solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a party" to the dispute. This prohibition had its genesis in
assumptions by the authors of the existence of solely domestic
matters which would not require consideration by an international
body. For instance, "[tihey considered, especially, immigration
and tariff matters as being solely within the domestic jurisdiction
of the States, ' 77 and therefore, out of bounds to all non-domestic
authorities. As a result, defendant Member-States refused the
Council's jurisdiction whenever their cases were referred to it.
As one of the critics of this prohibition, Professor Kelsen
argues that there is no such thing as a matter "solely within the
domestic jurisdiction" of a state. 78 Even though a given matter
is not directly regulated by the rules of international law, it is not
necessarily outside the limits of international law. Maltreatment of
nationals by a state, and disputes arising between or among states
claimed by one to be solely within its domestic jurisdiction are
technically not domestic. 79 More generally, any domestic event is
likely to affect the international public, and vice versa. When
article 15 (8) of the League Covenant speaks of a "matter which by
internationallaw is solely within the domestic jurisdiction,"8' 0 then
it is self-explanatory that there is hardly any matter which is solely
domestic as being without some international significance. The
75. See

KELSEN,

THE UNITED NATIONS:

supra note 59, at 295. See also H.
A

CRIcAL ANALYSIS

KELSEN, THE LAW OF

OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL

PROBLEMS

(1951) [hereinafter cited as THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS].
76. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15, para. 8.
77. KFLSEN, supra note 59, at 295. Hence the fallacy of States' assumptions, since there is no act which is solely or essentially outside the rule of law.
78. KELSEN, supra note 59, at 109.
79. Id. at 85.
80. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15, para. 8.
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grave fallacy of article 15(8) is that while the Council was given
the competence to examine disputes as to its jurisdiction"' it was
not allowed by its Member-States to make any recommendations,
a circumstance which encouraged some Member-States to act to
the detriment of the League." 2
The difference between article 2, paragraph 7 of the United
Nations Charter and article 15, paragraph 8 of the League Covenant may be summarized around five main points:
1. Whereas, under article 15 (8) of the League Covenant,
intervention prohibition was only restricted to intervention
by the League Council, under Article 2(7) of the U.N.
Charter, prohibition applies to all organs of the United
Nations except for the enforcement measures of chapter
VII. 8 3

2. Whereas, under article 15(8) only matters solely within
the domestic jurisdiction were out of bounds for intervention by the League, under article 2(7), the prohibiessentially within the domestic
tion applies only to matters
84
jurisdiction of any state.
3. Whereas, article 15(8) conferred competence upon the
League Council to determine whether a matter was solely
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, article 2(7)
requires that a dispute be brought before the Security
Council, General Assembly or the International Court of
Justice by a party or Member-State. If a party refuses to
acknowledge the jurisdiction of the United Nations by
claiming that the matter is essentially within its domestic
jurisdiction, then the United Nations is competent to
is genuinely within the party's
decide whether the matter
85
domestic jurisdiction.
81. That is, whether a given dispute was solely within the domestic jurisdiction of one of the parties or within the domain of international law.
82. The political crisis confronting the U.N. today is akin to the crisis which
confronted the League of Nations between 1931 and 1939. The League's "leukemia," similar to the situation in the U.N. today, was initiated by Japan's aggression against Manchuria in 1931 followed by Mussolini's aggression against Ethiopia in 1935. These acts were followed by a war-by-proxy between Italo-Germany and the U.S.S.R. in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), Japan's aggression
against China in 1937, and finally Hitler's consecutive aggressions against Austria
and Czechoslovakia in 1938, and Poland in 1939--events which not only led to
World War II, but also destroyed the League of Nations. See F. WELLBORN,
DIPLOMAnc HIsTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 312-26 (1964).
83. Compare LEAGUE OF NATIONs COVENANT art. 15, para. 8 with U.N.
CKATRmt art. 2, para. 7.
84. Id.
85. 6 U.N. SCOR 560th Meeting 3-4 (1951). This can be exemplified by
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4. Whereas, under article 15(8), the jurisdiction of the matter was to be decided within the framework of international law, this rule is specifically absent from article
2(7).
5. Whereas, under article 15(8), there is no provision which
governs whether Member-States were at liberty not to
submit their disputes to the League Council or any other
organ of the League for settlement, under article 2(7)
Member-States are expressly authorized not to submit
such disputes to either the Security Council, International
Court of Justice or any other organ of the United Nations
for settlement.8 6

As Lauterpacht notes, "[i]n interpreting the terms of Article
2, paragraph 7 commentators have concentrated their attention
on the meaning of the phrase 'matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state.' "87 As will be noted hereafter, "the replacement of the term 'solely' by the term 'essentially'

[has had] very undersirable consequences."8 8
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, [1951] I.C.J. 89.

Although Iran argued

that neither the Security Council nor the International Court of Justice had jurisdiction in this case, it was, however, up to the Court to decide whether it had
jurisdiction. Similarly, in the Indonesian case, the Netherlands, together with its
chief supporters, France and Belgium, had strongly warned the Security Council
that it had no competence in the case; however, the Netherlands eventually surrendered the case to the Security Council's competence. See note 123, infra.
86. M. RAJAN, UNITED NATIONS AND DOMESTIC JUISDICrION 404 (1958).

For instance, during the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case, Iran refused to acknowledge the jurisdiction of either the Security Council or the World Court on
the grounds that "[the United Kingdom had made 'abusive use' of the International Court of Justice" which, to Iran, had no jurisdiction over the case. See
note 85, supra.
Thus, the Government of Iran contended that: 1) the United Kingdom had
misrepresented the 1933 agreement between the Iranian Government and the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and that the agreement was really an abridgement
of the sovereign rights of Iran in favor of the company; 2) the United Kingdom
had erroneously taken a nonjusticiable question to the Court; and, 3) the United
Kingdom had erroneously invoked a tribunal which could not be competent to
hear the complaint without Iran's express consent.
The Government of Iran denied that it had flouted the Court's decisions,
and asserted that in this case the Court had no jurisdiction and, therefore, its

provisional measures were invalid. It also maintained that the Security Council had no competence to implement the Court's order on the grounds that both
article 94 of the Charter and article 41 of the Statute provide that only final decisions are binding. See 6 U.N. SCOR, 560th Meeting 9-12 (1951). See also M.
RAIjAN, UNITED NATIONS AND DoMEsTic JURISDIcrioN
87. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 50, at 167-70.

404 (1958).

88. THE LAw OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 75, at 777-78 (footnote

omitted).
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol6/iss2/5
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The roots of the "essentially" concept, in article 2(7) of the
Charter are no longer alien to the exponents of international law.
For instance, Kelsen states that:
During the discussion of Article 2, paragraph 7 at the [San
Francisco Conference] the delegate of Australia declared with
regard to the substitution of the word "essentially" for "solely"
he agreed with the opinion, expressed previously by the delegate of the United States, "that matters solely within domestic
jurisdiction were constantly contracting. For example, ,international agreement to promote full employment would have been
unheard of a few years ago and even now, although this matter remained within domestic jurisdiction . . . it was, however, "essentially" within domestic jurisdiction and that was
a better criterion to apply."' 9
To many students of international law, 90 the replacement of the
word "solely" with "essentially,"'" together with the omission of any
reference to "international law" hardly reduced the domain of
international law.
For instance, in the words of Professor Kelsen, "the fact that
Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter does not speak of matters
which are 'solely' but of matters which are 'essentially' within the
domestic jurisdiction of a state, is no improvement." 92 Lauterpacht also notes that even in the age of the League of Nations,
there were some matters, for example, conferment of nationality,
admission of aliens, or regulation of tariffs which were essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned. However,
they "ceased to be matters which, 'according to international law,'
89. Id. at 777 n.2.
Similarly, to Georg Schwarzenberger, "[t]he word 'essentially' has been substituted for 'solely'." G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
281 (1967). To P.E. Corbett, "Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations
Charter omits the explicit reference of international law and substitutes the word
'essentially' for the Covenant's 'solely'." P. CORBETr, LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE
RELATIONS OF STATES 81 (1951).
To both Oppenheim and Lauterpacht, "[tihe
expression 'essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state' is one capable
of divergent interpretations," and that to them "[ilt seems that the expression was
deliberately substituted for that used in Article 15(8) of the Covenant which referred to matters which, according to International Law, are exclusively within
the domestic jurisdiction of the State." L. OPPENHiM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
TREATISE 414-15 (8th Ed. 1967).
90. See, e.g., M. RAJAN, UNITED NATIONS AND DOMESTIC JURISDICTION
(1958); L. SOHN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON UNITED NATIONS LAW (1963); J.
BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS (1949).
91. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 281 (1967).
92. THE LAw oF TnE UNrrE NATIONS, supra,note 75, at 776.
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are exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the State as
soon as they became the subject of regulation by customary or
conventional international law."93
Therefore, it is open to question why, under the Charter,
such matters, though not directly regulated by international law,
should still be "essentially" within the domestic jurisdiction of the
State. Just as there are no matters which, by their very nature,
are "solely" within domestic jurisdiction of a State, there are no
matters which are "essentially" within the domestic jurisdiction
of a State. By analogy, whatever families, clubs, non-international
organizations or other entities may do behind closed doors, their
activities are neither "solely" nor "essentially" outside the limits
of their sovereign's law.
Since the principle of human rights is founded on fundamental customary law of protection for the oppressed, the activities
of every individual, group, club, and state are regulated not only
by municipal law, but also by international law. Behavior which
is essentially a matter of one's personal affairs may also be criminal
and thus subject to the rule of municipal law. Therefore, by
analogy, conduct between States, and between States and individuals is not essentially domestic.
As municipal law must intervene in personal disputes between
its nationals in order to maintain law and order, so must international law intervene in every dispute which has any element of
potential threat to international peace and security. And as Lord
Gordon emphasizes:
No one can lawfully be restrained or punished, or condemned
in damages, except for a violation of the law established to
the satisfaction of a judge or jury or magistrate in one of the
ordinary Courts of Justice.... The plea of "act of state" is
not permissible as a defense to an action in respect of anything done in the realm or to any action by a British subject.
... No one who is charged with violation of the law can effectively plead . . . that his act was done in obedience to the

command of a superior, even the command of the King. "The
King can do no wrong" imparts not only that the King cannot
be proceeded against for any alleged wrong, but also that he
cannot authorize any wrongful act so as to justify the wrong94
doer.
93.
94.

H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHIS 175 (1950).
See also Auma-Osolo
G. HEwART, THE NEW DESPoTIsM 35 (1929).
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By the same token, both individuals and States are automatically under the umbrella of international law.95 States fail to
realize that in the same manner which they expect their nationals
to be patriotic and peace loving, so the United Nations expects
these States to behave ethically in order to uphold the four basic
"Purposes of the United Nations."9' 6 Even if matters were not
explicitly regulated by any rule of international law because of
its present lack of codification, this does not mean that such
matters are therefore "essentially" within the domestic jurisdiction
of any State. In fact, even if some matters were not regulated
by a rule of customary international law or contractual international law, no single matter can simply become "solely" domestic
until and unless international law confirms them so. Specifically:
The question whether a matter is solely within the domestic
jurisdiction of a state can be decided only by examining the
status of international law with respect to this question; that is
'97
to say, it can be decided only "by international law."
And, as both Kelsen and Lauterpacht note, the change in
phraseology of article 15(8) of the Covenant to article 2(7) of
the Charter, and the omission of the reference to international law
has not made any improvement.98 That is to say, by replacing
the word "solely" with "essentially" one creates a connotation that
it is up to a sovereign State to decide whether the matter is essentially within its sovereignty. If this were the case, every Member-State would be at liberty to refuse to submit its disputes to
the U.N. for settlement as required of all Member-States and NonMember-States.9 9
Why and how did this confusion come about? Why was
it allowed to take place, and who is to blame for it? More important, can the confusion be rectified? Confusion with the domesShall the Rule of Law Speak, The Daily Tar Heel (University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill), April 11, 1968, at 3; Auma-Osolo, Law, The Courts and the Legal
Profession in Great Britain, Spring 1968 (unpublished paper, Department of
Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.) at 3-4.
95. See LAuTERPACHT, supra note 50, at 27-69.
96. See generally U.N. CHARTER art. 1, paras. 1-4.
97. Tim LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 75, at 777.

98. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 50, at 166-200;
supra note 75, at 776.
99. Cf. U.N. CHRTER art. 34, 35.

THE LAW OF THE UNITED NA-

TioNs,
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tic jurisdiction clause is hardly novel. At the San Francisco Conference, the Australian delegate fumbled in reference to article
2 (7), stating that an organization which" 'is genuinely international
in character' need not intervene in those domestic matters in which,
by definition, international law permits each . . . entire liberty
of action."' 10 Professor Kelsen explains that "he interpreted the
term 'domestic' to mean the opposite of 'international.' "10' Again,
at the Security Council meeting concerning the Spanish question,
the same Australian delegate raised a question contradicting the
opinion he had expressed at San Francisco: "Is the existence of
the Franco regime a matter of international concern and not
02
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Spain?""
Because of this phrasal confusion, Lauterpacht warns that:
It is arguable that a matter is essentially one of domestic concern if it is incapable by its nature of assuming an international
complexion, [that is], if it cannot have international repercussions. It may be difficult to adduce examples of such matters. There is no technical -- or immutable-sense attaching
to the term "essentially."' 0 3
Lauterpacht concludes that "[iln the modern age of socioeconomic and political interdependence, most questions which, on
the face of it, appear to be essentially domestic are, in fact, essentially international." 0 4 And, as Kelsen acknowledges, "[i]t is
obvious that this interpretation would completely paralyze the
effect of the first sentence of [a]rticle 2, paragraph 7."1°5
II.

A COMPARATIVE
A.

ANALYSIS

Analysis

As previously noted, article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter still
remains the favorite grounds for Member-States of the United
Nations to decry international interests in matters they erroneously
conclude to be "essentially within their domestic jurisdiction," and
to explain why the United Nations should not have any legal right
100. See THE LAW OF TIE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 75, at 775 n.5.

101. Id.
102. See I

JOURNAL OF THE SECuRrrY CoUNcIL 602f (1946).
LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 75, at 780 n.5.
103. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

104. Id.
105. THE

LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

See also

THE

175 (1950).

supra note 75, at 791.
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to intervene. Every Member-State recognizes that the United Nations was created for maintenance of world peace and security
and to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.
Despite this, most are basically preoccupied with what Professor
Hans Morgenthau calls national interest defined in terms of
power. 100 Resort to article 2(7) when the United Nations has
10 7
attempted to intervene is an example of this.
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter empowers the United Nations Security Council to investigate "action with respect to threats
to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression."10 8
Under article 39:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, . . . or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures [to take] . . .
to maintain or restore international peace and security.' 09
Moreover, articles 43 through 50 explicitly provide measures that
the Security Council may employ in the event of "any threat to
the peace" as envisaged in article 39. In addition, "[a]ny member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation
of the nature referred to in article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the Generaly Assembly.""10
Similarly, article 35 (2) provides that:
A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may
bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts
in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of
pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.,"
Apart from the authority granted by chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council is fully authorized to "recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment."' "l 2 In addition, the
Council "should also take into consideration that legal disputes
106. H. MORGENTHAu, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
(4th ed. 1966).
107. See generally L. SOHN, RECENT CASES ON U.N. LAW 271-812 (1963).
108. U.N. CHART R ch. VII.
109. Id., art. 39.
110. Id., art. 35, para. 1.
111. Id., para. 2. See, e.g., discussion of the Congo (Zairian) question in
Auma-Osolo, note 34, supra; Auma-Osolo, A Retrospective Analysis of United
Nations Activity in the Congo and the Significance for Contemporary Africa, 8
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451 (1975).
112. U.N. CHARTER art. 36, para. 1.
POWER AND PEACE 63
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should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the
Statute of the Court." 113 Furthermore, although the Charter
provides that the Security Council is the only U.N. organ with
"primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security, . ."."'
and that, "the General Assembly
shall not make any recommendations with regard to [a] dispute
or situation . . . [w]hile the Security Council is exercising in
respect [to that] dispute or situation the functions assigned to
it . . . ,"15 the Charter explicitly provides that maintenance of
peace is one of the purposes of the United Nations in toto, and not
solely of the Security Council per se." 6
In the 1956 Suez Canal crisis, after the Security Council's
action had been blocked by the British and French vetoes it was
the General Assemly which saved this planet from what could
have been World War III by establishing the U.N. Emergency
Force (UNEF)." 71 Similarly, in the 1960 Zairian case, when the
Security Council was blocked by the Soviet veto, it was the General Assembly which adopted a resolution supporting Dag Hammarskjold's plan for United Nations Operations in the Congo
(ONUC). 18 The General Assembly also played a key role
in Korea in 1950."19
Despite these facts, the question may be asked whether the
U.N. is rational enough to maintain international peace and security whenever and wherever there is an "existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. .... ,,120
While Member-States seem to be committed to the United
Nations' obligation, they are also committed to their egocentric
113. Id., para. 3.

See also Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, [1952] I.C.J.

131.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.,
Id.,
See
See

art. 24, para. 1.
art. 12, para. 1.
id., art. 1, para. 1.
G.A. Res. 1000, 11 U.N. GAOR, 1st Emergency Sess. at 2, U.N.

Doe. A/3353 (1956).

118. See G.A. Res. 1474, 15 U.N. GAOR (1960).
119. G.A. Res. 376, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. at 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775 at 9
(1950); G.A. Res. 384, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. at 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775 at 15
(1950); G.A. Res. 498, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. at 20A, U.N. Doc. A/1775/Add. I

at 1 (1950); G.A. Res. 500, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. at 20A, U.N. Doc. A/1775/Add.
I at 2 (1951).
120. Cf. U.N. CATEa art. 39.
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"national interests." ''
Because of this ambivalence, friction between the United Nations and its Member-States can be extremely
intense. For instance, in the Algerian, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Moroccan, Tunisian, South West African, Rhodesian, Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, and Vietnamese disputes, one or both
parties vehemently warned the United Nations to keep out of the
dispute when that organization attempted to intervene under chapter VII of the Charter.
In the Algerian dispute, France bitterly ordered the United
Nations to keep out, stating that if the U.N. attempted to intervene
in the dispute, it would be violating article 2, paragraph 7 of the
U.N. Charter. France also threatened that if the U.N. did not
comply, it would quit the U.N.' 2 2
In the Indonesian case, the Netherlands warned the United
Nations not to intervene in Indonesian affairs on the grounds that
this was a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
Netherlands.' 2 3 In the 1951 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case,
Iran challenged the United Nations' jurisdiction when the plaintiff, The United Kingdom, commenced the action in the Inter1 24
national Court of Justice.
During the Vietnam war, the United States kept the conflict
out of the U.N.'s reach by denying the United Nations the right to
settle the dispute between the Vietcong and South Vietnamese. 2 5
In the South West African case, Dutch settlers in South Africa have
constantly deprived the United Nations of supervisory access to
the South West African territory, thereby disabling the U.N. in its
attempt to examine apartheid and other forms of segregation in
1 26
the territory.
121. E. GROSS, THE UNrrED NATIONS:

SrRUCTURE FOR PEACE 124 (1962).
122. U.N. Docs. A/2915, A/2942, A/2949 Add. 1 (1955).

123. A.

TAYLOR,

INDONESIAN

INDEPENDENCE

AND TiE

U.N. (1950); U.N.

Dos. S/729, S/787, S/842, S/848, S/918-19, S/1117, S/1129 Add. 1 (1948);
Auma-Osolo, supra note 34, at 84.
124. Bishop, Juridical Decisions: Jurisdiction over Nationals for Acts Done

Abroad, 47 AM. J.

INT'L

L. 325-27 (1953); Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case,

I.C.J. Pleadings 74-75 (1951).

125. This case was not brought before the U.N.; however, on the U.N.'s concern for human rights in the Vietnam war, see U.N. Doc. S/10104 (1971), at 3.
126. See, e.g., L. SOHN, CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW 627-70 (1956);
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1050
A/8424 (1971).

(1971);

U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR (1971);
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Regarding the chronic problem in Ireland, the United Nations'
power has been blocked by the United Kingdom. 12 7 In Cyprus,
made it practically impossible
the acts of Greece and Turkey have
12 8
for the U.N. to settle the problem.
From the foregoing examples we can see that article 2(7)'s
ambiguous treatment of domestic jurisdiction does more than
hinder the U.N.'s attempts at maintaining world peace. It suggests,
and for some Member-States encourages unilateral action. Furthermore, some members erroneously equate the Principles of
the Charter to those of the League Covenant which was, in fact,
a simple political document. As Professor J.L. Brierly defined the
League, "[it] was hardly more than a name. . . . Through the
Covenant, it was not the League but the Members of the League
that were to act incertain ways .... "9129
Nonetheless, unlike the League, the U.N.'s successful management of numerous wars180 is an indicator of the United Nations'
extra-rationality and effectiveness in spite of article 2(7). Also,
it shows that even though article 2(7) by its phraseology suggests
contradictions, the U.N. could be a very reliable managerial instrument over world crises barring interference by self-centered
Member-States. But, if this is not so, why then, was the United
Nations created with a multiplicity of ad hocs such as the Economic and Social Council if these nations wished to exclude its competence and personality from international and social problems?
Why was a great deal of time spent at the San Francisco Conference planning a Charter containing, for example, a Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories,' 8 1 if the framers
truly believed that colonial policy was strictly a domestic matter
of the state concerned? Why were Member-States committed to
a cooperative effort to provide fundamental principles of human
127. This case was not officially brought before the U.N. as provided under
article 35(1) and (2) of the Charter, despite appeals by some Irish nationals for
U.N. intervention. However, for the U.N.'s concern for the problem, see U.N.

Doe. A/C.3/L18906/Rev. 2 (1971), at 4.
128. This impasse has resulted from reinforcement of Turkish and Greek
Cypriots with men and war materials by Turkey and Greece, respectively.
129. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATrlONS 106 (6th ed. 1963).
130. E.g., Greek (1947), Korean (1951), Suez Canal (1956), Lebanon
(1958), Zairian (1960), West New Guinea (1962), Yemen (1963), and Cyprus
(1964). See UNTrED NATIONs, EvERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONS 79-84 (1968); L.
SOHN, RECENT CASES ON U.N. LAw 271-812 (1963); Table 1, infra.
131. U.N.CHATaR ch. 11.
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rights if it was believed that article 2(7) permitted every Member-State to do as it pleased within its domestic jurisdiction?
Finally, are there such things as "matters essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of a state"?
B.

A Theory of InternationalPolicy and Law

What can be gleaned from the foregoing study? Is there
anything significantly new? If so, to what extent is it new and,
therefore, instrumental to further understanding of this complex
world? And if, as Dror advocates, social scientists must begin to
be instrumental as policy-makers with ideas essential to the elimination of problems inherent in prevailing public policies, 3 2 what
must be done now for and to the U.N.?
The U.N. peace-keeping experience to date confirms that
because of the amorphous and acephalous nature of the prevailing
international system, any large-scale policy or law is likely to
perish unless the support it initially receives remains constant
throughout its implementation. Significant diminution of the
initial momentum of any given policy process by implementors 133is
likely to disrupt or completely destroy the policy and its goals.
The prognosis in this study shows that the U.N. peace-keeping
policy has not only proven less than completely successful, but also
that its future success is critical to the maintenance of world peace.
It is given that the U.N. was, inter alia, charged with legal responsibilities superior to those of -the League of Nations,13 4 that the
Charter is a reflection of the U.N.'s peace-keeping policy, and
finally, that the Security Council, General Assembly and International Court of Justice, with the assistance of the SecretaryGeneral, and the Secretariat are charged with execution of this
policy.' 35 But, in reality, can the U.N. execute it? Has it been
successful in doing so since 1946? If so, to what degree?
The findings to these inquiries show that the U.N. has not
been successful. See Table 1 below.
132. See Y. DRORt, PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING REEXAMINED (1968).
133. See J. PRESSMAN & A. WLDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION 7-165 (1971).
134. Under article 39 and chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council
is more powerful than was the League Council under article 15 of the League
Covenant.
135. See generally U.N. CHARTER ch. I.
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TABLE 1136
A TYPOLOGY OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
BETWEEN 1946 AND 1975
DISPUTES
Genuinely Settled
by the U.N.

Algeria (1951)
Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co. (1951)
Cyprus (1964)
Greece (1947)
Hungary (1956)
Indonesia (1947)
Kashmir (1950)
Laos (1959)
Suez (1956)
Syria-Lebanon (1946)
Tibet (1959, 1961)
Yemen (1963)
West-New Guinea
(1962)
Zaire (1960-62)

Settled by SelfSeeking MemberStates

Berlin (1948, 61, 70)
Cambodia (1975)
Chile (1974)
China-India (1962)
China-USSR, along Amur-]
Issuri Rivers (1969)
Cuba Bay of Pigs (1960)
Cuba Missiles (1962)
Cyprus (1975)
Czechoslovakia (1968)
Dominican Republic
(1962)

Prevailing Unsettled crises

Angola
Ireland
Middle East
Namibia
Portugal
Rhodesia

South Africa
Spanish Sahara
USSR's Anti-

Semitism

East Germany (1953)
Goa, Domoa and Diu

(1961)
(1954)
Guinea Bissau (1974)
Jordan (1958)
Korea (1950)
Guatemala

Laos (1975)

Lebanon (1958)
Middle East (1967, 1972)
Mozambique (1974)
Panama (1959)
Tibet (1950)
U.S.S. Mayaquez (1975)
U.S.S. Pueblo (1968)
Vietnam (1975)
TOTAL = 15
(29%)

TOTAL = 28
(54%)

TOTAL = 9
(17%)

136. Unless otherwise indicated, all figures and tables presented are the author's work-product.
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As noted in Table 1, of fifty-two world problems, the U.N.
has genuinely settled only fifteen, as opposed to twenty-eight settled
by self-seeking Member-States. 137 Furthermore, it is noted that
nine of the total number of disputes have not yet been settled. In
reality, these have been deliberately excluded from the U.N.'s
management.
Another heuristic observation derived from this study is that
the U.N.'s peace-keeping strength diminishes in roughly inverse
proportion to the level of activity concurrently exercised by selfseeking Member-States. This phenomenon is illustrated by Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
A COMPARATIVE PEACE-KEEPING ROLE BETWEEN
THE U.N. AND ITS SELF-SEEKING MEMBER-STATES

z/

/

SSMS' role in

0
0

~UN's

0.

role in

peace-keeping
------

0

1946

1950

1954

1958

1962

1966

1970

1975

YEAR

Figure 1 shows that the U.N. peace-keeping policy was
launched with great enthusiasm. Between 1946 and 1949, the
U.N.'s role was very significant. But within four years, the U.N.

began to encounter serious challenges from some Member-States.
By 1950, during the Korean War, this challenge had grown so

great that the peace-keeping role in Korea was no longer a U.N.
effort but rather a United States enterprise. Of course it was the
U.N. flag under which the forces in Korea operated. But, technically speaking, the force there was a single Member-State's force.
137. The "self-seeking Member-States" are those states which have involved
themselves in a dispute, while discouraging the U.N. from an active peace-keeping
role.
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When its commanding general, Douglas MacArthur, was relieved
from command in Korea, that decision was made by the United
States.
As a result of this increasing challenge to the U.N.'s responsibility in the peace-keeping process, its competence in this
process has been significantly weakened. This weakening is illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 2.
TABLE 2
U.N. AND SELF-SEEKING MEMBER-STATES
IN PEACE-KEEPING ROLE
PERIOD

'DISPUTES
GSUN*
NO. (%)

1946-1949
1950-1953
1954-1957
1958-1961
1962-1965
1966-1969
1970-1974
1975-

3
3
2
4
3
0
0
0

1946-1975

SSSMS**
NO. (%)

( 75)
( 50)
( 67)
( 40)
( 43)
( 0)
( 0)
( 0)

( 25)
( 50)
( 33)
( 60)
( 57)
(100)
(100)
(100)

4
6
3
10
7
3
5
5

28 ( 62)

43

1
3
1
6
4
3
5
5

15 ( 38)

TOTAL
NO.

* Genuinely settled by the U.N.
** Settled by Self-Seeking Member-States.

FIGURE 2
PROPORTION OF DISPUTES SETTLED BY THE U.N. AND
ITS SELF-SEEKING MEMBER-STATES BETWEEN
1946 and 1970
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As noted in both Table 2 and Figure 2 the U.N.'s initial
effectiveness in 1946 was 75%. Four years later, its role began
dwindling toward zero. Conversely, the self-seeking MemberStates' initial activity in this enterprise was 25%. At the end of
four years, they had begun to challenge the U.N.'s role. While
the U.N.'s role today equals zero, the role of self-seeking MemberStates equals one. Furthermore, it has been noted that in 100%
of the recent disputes wherein the U.N. intervened or attempted
to do so, it received a rebuff.1 38
This study systematically shows the United Nations' present
strength in world peace-keeping to be far inferior to that of its
self-seeking Member-States. This raises the possibility that the
U.N. will cease to exist as did the impotent League of Nations
in 1941. 9 This prediction is well supported by the negative correlation in Figures 1 and 2 and Table 2 between time and the
U.N.'s peace-keeping role between 1946 and 1975.
This study shows also that the United Nations' problems in
peace-keeping policy implementation are a function of political
and technical cataracts built into the U.N. system.
The political cataracts are the self-seeking Member-States
which oppose the U.N.'s role in the peace-keeping process. This
problem was enhanced by the cold war between the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. As a result of the cold war, conflict intensified, and the
more it increased, the more these actors resorted to self-seeking
adventures conflicting with the U.N.'s peace-keeping role. By so
doing, the two principal actors have not only made it difficult for
the U.N.'s peace-keeping responsibilities to be met, but have
also made it impossible for smaller Member-States to remain independent and impartial. Figure 3 provides a model of this phenomenon.
Figure 3 hypothesizes that States A and B are adversaries as
in the cold war example of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Further, it
assumes that they are equally powerful militarily, that they have
relatively equal thermonuclear capabilities, and that one's first strike
is as powerful as the other's second strike. Finally, apart from A
and B, there are other states, all having relatively less military
capability.
138. This rebuff occurred in the disputes in Cyprus, South and South West
Africa, Ireland, and Vietnam.

139. The collapse of the League was a result of actions of the self-seeking
states of that period, specifically, Italy, Germany, and Japan. See note 82, supra.
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FIGURE 3
ROLE AND EFFECT OF POWERFUL STATES ON
WEAKER STATES: MODEL 1
Weaker State
(e.g., Kenya)

do

X

Powerful
State B
(e.g., U.SSR.)

Powerful
State A
(e.g., U.S.)

y
(incentives, e.g., aid
for the weaker state)
+

positive perceptions; - = negative perceptions; X = Act

Because of this antipathy and equal "physical" capability, any
perceptive mechanism between A and B is likely to be negative,
but relatively positive toward weaker states. Also, because a
weaker state has nothing ,to gain by attempting to engage in a
confrontation which, in fact, could destroy it, the latter is likely
to develop a positively neutral or non-aligned attitude towards
both A and B. However, owing to the fact that neither A nor B
can risk loss of political prestige to the other, A and B may independently engage in alliance-cultivation.1 40 These activities may
be conducted even though A and B know such activities to be for
,their own egocentric -advantage and inconsistent with international
law. But, because A and B cannot afford to be identified as
criminal, both may independently advance excuses to support their
activities.1 4 '
To fulfill self-seeking goals, B, for example, may use its social
powers. It may either reward or use coercive power to influence
the weaker state. For example, if the latter did an act, such as disassociating from A politically, economically, or ideologically, then
B might reward that weaker state with certain economic, military,
140. This is exemplified by the U.S. action in creation of NATO, SEATO,
and so on, and the U.S.S.R. vis a vis the Warsaw Pact.
141. See THE SHAPINo OF AMERIcAN DIPLOMAcy 1083-1100 (W. Williams,

ed. 1956).
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or technical incentives. 142 As a result of this propaganda warfare,
antagonistic pro-A and pro-B factions are likely to develop within
the weaker state, as illustrated in Figure 4.143 As a consequence
of this development, political strife is highly likely which may, in
turn, cause the political system of that weaker state to become disrupted and to malfunction. 4
FIGURE 4145
A STRATEGIC MODEL OF THE EFFECTS OF EXTRANALITIES ON THE FATE OF A WEAKER STATE:
MODEL 2
INTRANALITY X
A pro-elite faction. therefore.

EXTANAITYA 1POLITICAL

supportive of the elite in power.

"

EXTRANALITY A
e.g., communism [

I
"
E X T R A N A L IT Y

B]

INTRANALITIY

1 Induced

SYSTEM[

e.g., capitalism

to

become

Y

disillu-

sioned, not to support the
elites policy and to get rid of

that elite.

Channel of Extra-Societal Impact on the Weaker System
-

-

-

-

Permeable Membrane of the System

In Figure 4, a weaker political system is likely to develop
antagonistic factions (Intranalities X and Y) due to extra-societal
influence from either Extranality A or B.' 46 This phenomenon
occurs in almost every weaker Member-State of the U.N.,'147 and
weaker non-members as well.
The magnitude of the political confusion and conflict initiated
142. See FRENCH & RAVEN, The Bases of Social Power, GRouP DYNAMICS
259-69 (3d ed. 1968).
143. Auma-Osolo, The Goals of the Nations of Africa Reconsidered: Some
Sources of Problems and Their Prescriptions,6 PAN-AFRICAN J. 20-23 (1973). See
INTERNATIONAL ASPECrS OF CIVIL STRIFE (J. Rosenau, ed. 1964).
144. Auma-Osolo, supra note 143, at 20-23.
145. Id. at 21 (revised figure).
146. As in the case of the Korean, Vietnamese and Zairian questions.
147. E.g., Cuba, Chile, Nicaragua, Laos, Cambodia, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece,
are obvious examples of such target states. See Auma-Osolo, supra note 143, at
20-23.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1976

33

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2 [1976], Art. 5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 6

and promoted by the major parties to the cold war, shows that selfseeking behavior among the most powerful U.N. Member-States is
potent indeed. The more this behavior has mounted, the more
numerous the multi-international defense systems have come into
competition with the U.N.'s peace-keeping role. 14 8 This theory is
illustrated in Figure 5, Model 3-A. The increase in the major
actors' behavior has also caused the multi-international defense systems to overshadow the U.N.'s peace-keeping role. This is illustrated in Figure 5, Model 3-B.
FIGURE 5
DECREASE IN U.N. PEACE-KEEPING ROLE AND
THE GROWTH OF SELF-SEEKING ROLE, 1946-1975.
UN

SSMS

Model 3-A

Model 3-B

SSMS

1975

The technical cataractsare, succinctly, those prohibitive norms
either accidentally or erroneously built into the Charter such as
article 2, paragraph 7, which counteract the U.N.'s peace-keeping
responsibility. As previously noted these cataracts are centered
around the principle of sovereign equality.
Because of the interaction between these two interdependent
variables, the political and technical cataracts, what the U.N.
148.

Examples include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Warsaw Pact,

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Organization of American States, and the Organization of African Unity.
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does or can do is determined by a tug-of-war between the anti-U.N.
and the pro-U.N. forces.' 4 9 In the course of this tug-of-war, consensus within the U.N. implementational apparatus is critically
important indeed. But the prime determinants of the rate at
which a given crisis can be addressed or settled will typically be
the number of decisions and clearances required for any given
policy implementation. Because of these variables, U.N. peacekeeping programs are nearly always delayed, distorted, and at
times destroyed.
The United Nations difficulties in policy implementation
and enforcement are compounded by the tendency towards dominance which is common to all states. This universal trait of national behavior conflicts directly with the guarantee of cooperation
required for the success of any U.N. peace-keeping policy.
What should a social scientist do to help the U.N. overcome
such a problem? Given that failure is likely to be fatal, what must
be done now for future advancement?
III.

CONCLUSION

This inquiry has re-examined and analyzed the usurped legal
role of the United Nations, its competence, and the obstacles to its
dispute settlement potential in the present world. A number of
contradictions which make it difficult for the U.N. to function
effectively as a rational, goal-oriented institution have been noted.
The data show that endowed with its universal international
personality, the United Nations has been extremely instrumental
in a number of furious political disputes potentially leading to
World War 111.150
On the other hand, the findings show that in spite of its
position of apparent power, the United Nations remains virtually
paralyzed by its own Charter and self-seeking Member-States. Succinctly, the Charter which authorizes the United Nations to maintain world peace and security' 5 ' is the same Charter which attempts to prevent the United Nations from executing this obligation. Because of this confusing dualism inherent in the Charter,
149. The pro-U.N. faction mainly includes the Afro-Asian and Scandinavian
Member-States.
150. For instance, it has played a very decisive role in the Indonesian crisis
(1947), the Korean crisis (1951), the Algerian crisis (1956), the Suez crisis
(1956), the Zairian crisis (1960), the West New Guinea crisis (1962), and the
Cyprus crisis (1964).
151. See generally U.N. CIrARTR chs. VI, VII.
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the U.N. has encountered threats from Member-States when attempting to intervene in those disputes potentially leading to international crises. 152 The U.N.'s role as international peace-keeper
is at present eclipsed by the unilateral enforcement activities of
the stronger self-seeking Member-States. This encourages the
exertion of extra-societal influence by stronger states towards the
weaker, a phenomenon which at once heightens world conflict by
increasing the likelihood of collision between two adverse selfseeking Member-States competing to influence the same target state,
and also works towards the tragic demoralization of the most sought
after weaker states.
In re-examining the effect of article 2, paragraph 7, vis d vis
the United Nations' competence under chapter VI and especially
chapter VII, it was concluded that the latter is in toto paramount
to the former. This is demonstrated by the positive results in several of the cases noted in Table 1, showing that the United Nations' competence over the problem of domestic jurisdiction can
be superior. The findings also suggest that although today's international political life has not yet reached a point which would
permit the U.N. to become a supra-international person exceeding states' sovereignty,' " the means by which the present and
future world problems can be resolved is through rigorous innovation within the U.N. itself.
To bring about this metamorphosis, the U.N. must become
extra-rational,15 4 and it must innovate. Accordingly, the U.N.
should seriously consider development of an independent World
Military Command composed of:
152. A prime example is the 1956 Algerian question where France threatened

to withdraw from the United Nations unless the U.N. stopped "interfering" in the
Algerian problem.

See note 122 supra. In the Indonesia question in 1947, the

Netherlands was similarly embittered against the United Nations. See note 123,
supra. In the Vietnam issue, the United States kept the case out of the United
Nations' reach; in the "Rhodesian
Britain did the same.

unilateral Declaration

In the apartheid problem in both South
Dutch settlers' government of South Africa
Nations' right of intervention since 1947.
first and last report to the United Nations

of Independence,"

and South West Africa, the minority
has completely paralyzed the United
In 1947, South Africa submitted its
on the League of Nations mandated

territory of South West Africa. However, while in both 1950 and 1960 the International Court of Justice found the government of South Africa's actions to be

inconsistent with the mandatory obligations, in 1966, the Court reversed its position in favor of that government. See South West African Case, [1966] I.C.J.
4.
153. F. SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE LAW OF PEACE AND
WAR 412-26 (1966).
154. Y. DRao, PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING REEXAMINED 149-53 (1968).
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A military unit in the United Nations to advise the SecretaryGeneral in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of peaceobservation and peace-keeping mission. 155
To augment this Command, one supervisory military unit in
each continent should be established to collect intelligence and to
inform the Secretary-General of any situation which threatens
world peace and security. The consent of either or both parties to
the dispute must be irrelevant to the determination of such a threat.
The U.N. must also obtain a mandatory guarantee from its Member-States assuring the United Nations that they will be at the disposal of the United Nations whenever a United Military Force
must be deployed to forestall deterioration of the peace. Finally,
the United Nations must immediately resume its world peace-keeping mission as originally planned under the U.N. Charter."'
With these capabilities, the United Nations should deploy
its resources in striving toward the rule of international law and
the establishment of a peaceful world order. Moreover, the United
Nations must recognize the need for immediate action because any
delay in the control and containment of these policies in international political life threatens world order and advancement.
To this end, it is hoped that, with this inherent power, the U.N.
will be innovative and pragmatic, finally resuming its mandatory role in world peace-keeping, and preservation of human
rights. This proposal must be executed immediately if prevailing
and futire breaches of world peace and crimes against humanity
are to be eliminated. It is time that resources and knowledge be
directed not toward self-destruction but toward self-improvement.
The U.N. cannot achieve this objective without collective support from Member-States and individuals alike. It is neither necessary nor likely that given this support, the U.N. will enjoy full or
total success. Rather, all that can be hoped for is optimal satisfaction. It is not expected that Member-States should relinquish
their sovereignty to the U.N.; what is called for here is simply
that some responsibility be assumed by Member-States. The more
they are extra-rational,the greater the chances for the existence
of an extra-rational and effective U.N. peace-keeping mission.
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